

FAILING TO EXCITE

THE DIXIE DYNAMO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

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The motivation for this essay—and the reason for placing it at the end of this collection—is presumably related to the fact that we are currently living in an uncertain period wherein North Carolina’s principal economic problems, challenges, and opportunities have global dimensions or, at the very least, global connections.¹ This being the case, someone perforce had to take on North Carolina’s engagement with the world over the last few decades, a period of rapid globalization, and speculate a bit about the future—about the direction of the state’s “new voyages,” in other words. Fair enough, I’ll get to such matters by and by, but not right away. Let me take a moment to explain why.

From my perspective, North Carolina in many ways should be seen as a global region from the start, despite several periods of decelerating globalization or even deglobalization. This is so throughout its history, both when one conceives of globalization in a narrow economistic sense as a relative increase of transnational economic flows—products, capital, labor, and the like—over a sustained period of time and, even more emphatically, when one conceives of economic globalization more broadly as a process wherein the behavior and actions of economic actors are substantively affected, if not decisively shaped, by transnational processes, events, opportunities, and challenges.²

Viewed so, North Carolina was global even during its so-called Rip Van Winkle period in the nineteenth century—indeed, even before the first permanent settlement of Europeans and Africans in the Albemarle area in the 1650s and 1660s. And the ways in which the groups of elites that historically have controlled North Carolina engaged and responded to the problems, challenges, and opportunities attending globalization have had profound long-term consequences, shaping the state’s developmental trajectory and imposing sharp limits on its options in subsequent periods. Economists like to use the concept of path dependence or path influence to capture this idea,

which essentially means history matters, and in the case of North Carolina's development, history matters a lot.³

At this point, a rough periodization scheme for globalization is perhaps needed in order to structure North Carolina's historical policy responses, whether explicit or implicit. Although they often use different nomenclature and vary a bit on dating schemes, most global economic historians follow more or less the same basic periodization and conceptual scheme for globalization during the modern era, by which we basically mean the period between roughly 1450 or 1500 CE and the present. This scheme can be criticized for being somewhat Eurocentric—its fit with the West is better than with Asia—but because we are most interested in North Carolina's place in things, let us proceed. The first phase in modern globalization schemes generally runs from 1450 or 1500 until 1750 or 1800. The phase corresponds closely with the outward economic expansion of certain nation-states or other geopolitical entities in Europe to other parts of the world. Some writers break down this lengthy period into subperiods, with a period of slower expansion and growth in the seventeenth century (long or short). But, considered in toto, this was a period of economic dynamism in much of the West, the principal results of which were the beginnings of what could for the first time be called a real “world” economy, the relative economic rise of Europe or at least of parts thereof in the order of things, and the onset of a fundamental rerouting or reorientation of world economic power from East to West.⁴ As part of this process of economic restructuring, we see a global reallocation of labor and capital in a relative sense, perhaps most notably to what Kenneth Pomeranz has famously referred to as the “ghost acres” of the Americas. It was there that these factors of production were combined with American “land” (natural resources) to generate greater economic output, a preponderance of which output redounded over time to the advantage of European and Euro-American individuals and collectivities of one sort or another, for the processes of production and accumulation were initiated and led by the same.⁵ North Carolina's early development can be viewed as one very, very minor part of this global economic shift.

Abstracting a bit, in the area constituting what is now North Carolina the period between roughly 1650 and 1750 can be viewed as one of primitive extraction and accumulation, marked, as it was, by the enslavement and sale of Indians, piracy, lumbering, extractive forest industries—tar, pitch, turpentine, resin, and the like—and the beginnings of plantation agriculture in parts of the region, particularly in the area around Cape Fear in the southeast. Whatever else occurred in North Carolina during this murky period—

sources are much less complete than they are for neighboring South Carolina, which developed more rapidly—we can be sure that there was plenty of the “barbarism” that Marx associated with primitive accumulation and about which Bernard Bailyn has recently written so eloquently.⁶ And by the end of the period, c. 1750, roughly 20 percent of the population of North Carolina was enslaved, a stark illustration at that time of social asymmetry and economic inequality and a harbinger of further asymmetries and inequalities to come.⁷

Most writers on the history of globalization argue that this early phase of globalization was followed by a second, more emphatic and fully realized phase running from the middle to late eighteenth century until around the time of the First World War. These writers employ slightly different chronologies; Eric J. Hobsbawm, for example, employs the concept of the “long” nineteenth century (1789–1914) to encapsulate this period, while Immanuel Wallerstein sometimes begins a bit earlier—c. 1750—but also sees this period ending in 1914, while C. A. Bayly, more recently, uses the dates 1780–1914.⁸ Such small differences in chronology notwithstanding, what all three of these writers, and many others, see happening in this period is at once an acceleration and intensification in the process of global economic integration that the world had experienced in the period beginning in c. 1450–1500 CE.

During this period, the U.S. South, already an important source of staple commodities for the Western world—tobacco and rice, most notably—became the entire world’s leading exporter of cotton, linking the region’s fortunes closely to those of rapidly industrializing parts of what some refer to as the core and others the metropolis and still others, less grandiosely, Lancashire and New England. Indeed, such was the importance of cotton from the U.S. South to both globalization and industrialization during the long nineteenth century that Hobsbawm, who coined that term, has argued that the true importance of the American Civil War in world historical terms was “the transfer of the South from the informal empire of Britain (to whose cotton industry it was the economic pendant) into the new major industrial economy of the United States, which economy was dominated, of course, by the victorious North.” Hobsbawm goes on to argue, moreover, that this transfer “might be regarded as an early if giant step on the road which was in the twentieth century to turn all the Americas from a British to an American economic dependency.”⁹ But enough about the twentieth century—we are getting ahead of ourselves.

What of North Carolina during this long period? The state increasingly

found its niche as a provider of raw materials and agricultural staples (cotton, tobacco) for world markets and, after c. 1880, as a provider of relatively rudimentary processed manufactured goods (textiles, tobacco products, and later furniture) as well. The Old North State was hardly one of the South's agricultural leaders in the nineteenth century, but it did partake in the principal developmental patterns informing the region, and it did pick up its economic pace a bit in a relative sense in the latter part of the century. It was the ninth largest cotton-producing state in 1860, for example, and the eighth largest in 1900. It was the fifth largest tobacco producer in 1860 but rose to second in 1900, although it still remained far behind Kentucky in overall production.¹⁰

What about manufacturing production? The general public—and, alas, more historians than one would think—believe that North Carolina had become one of the South's manufacturing leaders by the end of the nineteenth century. The state may not have been one of the principal plantation states of the South, this line goes, but because of the rise of the cotton-textiles industry, it had become one of the region's manufacturing bellwethers by 1900. Well, not really. Measured in terms of the total value of manufacturing product, North Carolina's relative position in the region actually slipped from sixth in 1860 to eighth in 1900, in the latter year trailing behind Maryland, Kentucky, Virginia, Louisiana, Texas, Georgia, and Tennessee. Even if we define the South more narrowly and exclude Maryland and Kentucky, North Carolina only rises to sixth. Interestingly, North Carolina's relative decline in manufacturing between 1860 and 1900 becomes even greater if one uses this narrower definition of the South. By excluding Maryland and Kentucky, North Carolina moves up to number four in manufacturing output in the South in 1860, trailing only Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia, which means that Texas and Louisiana had leapfrogged the Tar Heel State in the late nineteenth century.¹¹ To be sure, the textiles complex that emerged in North Carolina after 1880 would later prove instrumental to the state's rising economic fortunes, but that sector was not yet large enough in 1900 to move the needle significantly.

Interestingly, the role of tobacco in nineteenth-century North Carolina is similarly misunderstood today. While the relative importance did in fact grow dramatically in North Carolina in the late nineteenth century with the rise of "bright" tobacco, the industry was not yet sufficiently powerful to lift the agricultural sector, much less the state as a whole, out of the economic doldrums. Even though North Carolina had risen to number two in tobacco production in the United States by 1900, the state still produced only about

40 percent of the amount of tobacco (primarily burley) produced in Kentucky. It was not until much later in the twentieth century that North Carolina came to dominate tobacco production in the United States.¹²

Whether we focus on agriculture or manufacturing, we find that throughout the “long” nineteenth century in North Carolina most production occurred under conditions of tight controls over labor, whether slave or free, agricultural or industrial. Remember that roughly one-third of the state’s population was enslaved in 1860, and even after the end of slavery, agricultural labor, however free in a titular sense, often worked under tight constraints of one sort or another.¹³ Industrial labor, too, was subjected to considerable regimentation, whether in lumber camps, turpentine orchards, or cotton-textile mills.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, there were social and political concomitants of such a labor regime. We find little state investment in human capital of any form, for example, and but for a few exceptional—and brief—periods (Congressional Reconstruction, Fusionism in the 1890s), very tight political control by a narrow and narrow-minded white elite.

The upshot of elite control over the state, from a developmental perspective, was a thin and attenuated economic base in North Carolina, characterized by many structural weaknesses. Briefly put, North Carolina’s economy was characterized throughout the nineteenth century by a large primary sector and a relatively rudimentary secondary sector; a thin, disarticulate internal market; a linear, conveyor-belt transportation system; low levels of support for education, public health, and other public goods; and highly unequal distributions of income and wealth. In other words, the economy in many parts of North Carolina very much resembled those of other plantation-based states in the South.¹⁵ If the state did not have plantations districts such as those in the South Carolina–Georgia Low Country, the Natchez area of Mississippi, or southeastern Louisiana, or even such as that emerging in the Mississippi–Arkansas Delta, it nonetheless was home to many large plantations, particularly in the eastern part of the state, and shared many of the characteristics and, alas, socioeconomic pathologies of these other, better-known plantation districts.¹⁶ In this regard, keep in mind the name Halifax County, a plantation district in the eastern part of the state, for it will reappear later in this essay.

In any case, circa 1900, as William Link has pointed out, the state, which never reaped the same level of benefits that had accrued from plantation agriculture in these other areas, was known for its poverty, illiteracy, and underdevelopment—even in a southern context—as much as anything else.¹⁷ Indeed, North Carolina was still known for these things as late as the middle of the twentieth century and had the dubious distinction of being one

of the poorest states in the South, the poorest region in the United States—ahead of only Mississippi and Arkansas—as late as 1952.¹⁸

Back to 1900, though: At the turn of the last century, North Carolina was in trouble, and as a result, during the so-called Progressive Era momentum began to build among political and economic elites to invest somewhat more in infrastructure, public education, and human capital. Such investments were in fact made, impacting the state's development in a positive way on balance, despite the fact that most of these investments were made in ways that continued to discriminate explicitly or implicitly on the basis of race and class. Moreover, the policy preferences and patterns established during the early twentieth century continued during the next phase of the global economy during the 1920s and 1930s. It was during these interwar decades, for example, that the University of North Carolina was transformed from irrelevancy into a force for social betterment not only in North Carolina but also in the South as a whole.¹⁹

Before moving on to this next phase in the global economy, a few words are in order about the accuracy of a label North Carolina has worn for some time with respect to the nineteenth century: the Rip Van Winkle State. Although various commentators disagree about the label's origins and even its meaning, most of those who employ the label use it in some way to suggest that the state was "asleep," if not dormant, during much of the century, that not much "was going on anywhere" in the state for parts of the century, and that the state was little interested in economic development.²⁰

There are a number of problems with this formulation, especially if we are speaking of the state's economy. For starters, North Carolina, as we have seen, was already well integrated into extraregional, indeed, transatlantic factor and product markets even during the colonial period, and such integration only intensified in the nineteenth century with the spread of cotton and tobacco cultivation in the state and the rise of the cotton-textiles industry in the 1880s and 1890s. Charges of state-level torpor and somnolence notwithstanding, North Carolina and North Carolinians were very much "awake," interested in economic development of a limited sort, and part of the wider world during that century. Two anecdotes involving African/African Americans attest improbably but amply to this last point: an African Muslim slave living in the Wilmington area wrote an autobiography in Arabic in 1831, and a Hindi-speaking African American from the state was one of the builders in 1899–1900 of the Gokteik Viaduct, a world-famous railroad trestle in the remote Shan State of Burma.²¹ Who would have thunk it?

There is clear evidence of international attachments, then—and many more examples can be referenced. But one must nonetheless always keep

in mind that the degree of global consciousness and level of global engagement in evidence in North Carolina were clearly shaped and structured—and ultimately delimited—by the state’s political economy. In developmental terms, North Carolina got precisely what the elites who controlled the state wished for in the nineteenth century: an “extractive” economic and institutional framework, based upon arbitrary power, a narrow political base, rigged markets, and a capricious legal system, all of which redounded to the advantage of small groups of insiders. Poverty and underdevelopment may have been the result for the masses, but that mattered little to the ever watchful elite, which was able to garner a disproportionate share of power and resources while keeping the masses, but for brief outbursts, in a position of political repose. In many ways, then, nineteenth-century North Carolina comports well with the “extractive” state template developed recently by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*.²²

During the second decade of the twentieth century the world entered into another economic phase, this one quite unexpected. For a variety of reasons—two monumental wars, a great depression, political upheavals, and an economic and sociopolitical backlash against globalization—the world deglobalized between 1914 and 1945, a period some refer to as that of “the Second Thirty Years’ War.” Economic trends and patterns long in evidence—robust transnational flows of capital, trade, and labor—were all reversed during this period, as the world suffered through three decades of severe economic stresses, myriad political and social woes, and truly cataclysmic military conflicts.²³

Not surprisingly, North Carolina’s economy, which had shown a bit of spark early in the twentieth century, was adversely affected by these changes, finding itself in a dizzying downward spiral by the early 1930s, from an already pinched and parlous economic position. Per capita income in North Carolina in 1929, for example, was but 47.4 percent of the national average, while living costs in the state, as represented by the Consumer Price Index, were 71 percent of the national average.²⁴ And, in an absolute sense, at least, things only got worse. The agricultural economy, which had been rebuilt in a retrograde manner after the demise of slavery, completely collapsed during the 1930s, and the state’s textiles industry, scissored by overproduction and underconsumption and buffeted by competition, found itself in crisis as well.

North Carolina’s political leaders attempted to respond, extending the “Progressive” framework established in the decades before the First World War, with continued investment in infrastructure (especially roads), educa-

tion, and public health, but the approach to development was still narrow, top down, and subject to many class/racial constraints. If “Progressivism” was “for whites only,” as C. Vann Woodward put it, the interwar years meant more of the same. The “progressive plutocracy” that V. O. Key Jr. talked about after the Second World War was already busy promoting and protecting its programs and initiatives—and prerogatives—albeit at the same time attempting to beat back even more retrograde political forces at home, forces represented by Josiah Bailey and anti-New Deal pols of his ilk, not to mention business interests represented by reactionaries such as David Clark of the *Southern Textile Bulletin*.²⁵ In any case, understanding and interpreting “Progressivism” is a trickier proposition than it might appear to be on the surface, laden, as the concept is, with ambiguity. To be sure, the adjective “progressive” can connote improvement and amelioration, but it can also merely mean moving to another phase or stage, or even getting worse or advancing in severity, as in a progressive disease. Progressivism as made manifest in North Carolina can fit comfortably under any of these definitions, depending on what one chooses to emphasize, what one chooses to see.

However one chooses to interpret “progressive plutocratic” policies in postwar North Carolina, the broader economic landscape wherein they were hatched was a far cry from that of the interwar years. Beginning in 1945 the entire world economy entered another phase of globalization, one that, despite some short reversals, we are still living through today. Although most scholars view the entire period since 1945 as one of globalization, many break the epoch into two subperiods, the first lasting from 1945 to the 1970s, and the second beginning c. 1980. Both subperiods were marked by robust transnational economic flows over sustained periods of time, but the intensity of such flows accelerated and intensified in the latter subperiod. For the world as a whole, the surge in globalization was on balance extremely positive, especially for less developed countries, but in a relative sense much of the population of the United States—and certainly much of the population of North Carolina—clearly benefited more in a relative sense at least during the first subperiod than they have in the second.²⁶

In terms of public policy in North Carolina, the main takeaway, I believe, is that the business-oriented, pro-development governmental responses in both subperiods were often on balance pretty sound—and in some cases prescient, inspired, and even admirable—within the confines of what Key called plutocratic progressivism and what others have subsequently (perhaps more charitably) referred to as business progressivism.²⁷ That said, governmental responses were much more successful in the first subperiod, and in my view they will have to change going forward if they are to achieve such success

again. Why? Because of the path-dependent nature of the state's history or, in other words, because of the legacies of the implicit economic development strategy that has characterized much of North Carolina's history virtually from the start.

The key to North Carolina's growth strategy in the postwar decades—indeed, to the strategy of the Sunbelt considered as a whole—was the removal of a huge number of marginalized workers out of a backward, dreadfully inefficient, low-skill, undercapitalized agricultural sector and into sectors where even unskilled labor such as theirs could be employed more efficiently. Where? For the most part in low-skill, low-value-added manufacturing industries (particularly those of an assembly or processing rather than fabricating nature).²⁸ While such industries (textiles and apparel, furniture, tobacco products, light assembly, food processing, etc.) aren't great, by adding capital to human labor they significantly increased productivity, allowing for rising wages, income, and living standards for increasing proportions of the state's population. In this, the state (and the region as a whole) was following (or at least repeating) a tried-and-true, time-tested development strategy that most other areas of the developed world had already experienced: the move from agriculture to light industry. To be sure, new industries were beginning to emerge in the period, and obviously there was the growing importance of banking and finance and the (slow) rise to prominence of the Research Triangle Park, but the big story, developmentally speaking, was getting people off the farms—not into investment houses or labs but into factories, mills, and plants. It was this process, more than anything else, that allowed North Carolina and the South to grow. In terms of per capita income, for example, the mean figure for the South was only 60 percent of that of the United States in 1940 and a little over 70 percent in 1950, but the rise of manufacturing in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s brought this figure up to the 87 or 88 percent of national norms by the late 1970s.²⁹

By the 1980s, however, this very successful strategy began to play itself out. As technological change reduced labor requirements in southern manufacturing and jobs were increasingly lost to other lower-cost parts of the world due to globalization, the Sunbelt's convergence upon national economic norms slowed before coming entirely to a stop in the early 1990s. Southern per capital income—with the "South" defined as the states comprising the Confederate States of America plus West Virginia and Kentucky—has been stuck at about 90 percent of the national average since then and would likely be trending lower without the outlier Texas, whose energy-based economy has been doing fairly well in recent years.³⁰


Even before the end of convergence, the "lead story" of the so-called Sun-

belt was misleading—or at least incomplete. As the North Carolina-based policy center MDC, Inc., put it in a seminal report in 1986, there were, even then, many “shadows” in the Sunbelt, particularly in rural and nonmetropolitan parts of the region. And once the decline of light industry accelerated in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, these areas have often become economic basket cases, forlorn if not hopeless places, beset by every imaginable social pathology, places where the best economic development strategy is often “a ham sandwich and a one-way bus ticket out.”³¹

To be sure, the trajectory of better-situated parts of the region—metro areas (particularly financial centers and information and communication technology hubs populated in large part by what Richard Florida calls the “creative class”), tourist areas, affluent retirement communities, energy-rich areas, and areas around major universities, military bases, government centers—have done better economically, increasingly pulling away from the rural and nonmetropolitan South. But even the dynamism of such areas has not been able to lift the economic fortunes of all of the residents living therein—all of the major metropolitan areas of both North Carolina and other parts of the South include zones of terrifically high poverty—much less of the region as a whole.³²

In many ways, what we are seeing in the South looks a lot like what many development economists call a “middle-income trap,” wherein economies stagnate after reaching a certain “middle” level, usually because their manufacturing and labor-cost structures no longer allow them to compete with lower-cost producers, but their labor forces aren’t skilled enough to compete higher up the value chain.³³ Once so ensnared, it has proven hard historically for nations to escape this condition. Indeed, an international context, the motto of southern workers—including North Carolina workers—reads “I’m pretty expensive and not very skilled.” And there doesn’t seem to be much in the way of political will to change things, at least in North Carolina, a state some people for some reason still see as different from other parts of the South. As my friend Ferrel Guillory noted long ago, though, “the farther you get from North Carolina, the more progressive it looks.”³⁴ That is to say, once you’re here, you know the truth.

For some sobering context about both North Carolina and the South more generally, let’s think globally, as the cliché goes. In Bangladesh, even after a state-mandated 77 percent increase in November 2013—effective December 1—the minimum wage for textile workers was roughly \$68.00 a month. The absolute minimum workweek there is fifty hours per week or two hundred hours per month—which means wages of 34 cents an hour. Many of these workers have access to the same technology as do Southern



workers—one major reason that Bangladesh is a major supplier for Tommy Hilfiger, the Gap, Calvin Klein, H&M, and so forth.³⁵ David Carlton and I wrote a piece in 2005 called “Southern Textiles in Global Context,” which emphasized this same point but focused on earlier periods in the industry’s history.³⁶ Then as now, the South, a low-cost manufacturer in a United States or even North American context, is a very high-cost manufacturer when viewed in a global context. Tens of thousands of displaced textile and apparel workers in North Carolina know this all too well. And such displacement did not begin or end with the much-mentioned closure of the Pillowtex facility in Kannapolis in July 2003, the largest plant closure in North Carolina history, which led to the termination of almost 5,000 workers in one fell swoop.³⁷

With these points in mind, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that the South in general and the state of North Carolina in particular were hit so hard by the recession of 2007–9. North Carolina’s unemployment rate was one of the highest in the nation from the onset of the recession until well into 2013, and even in January 2014—four and a half years after the end of the recession—it was still 6.7 percent, higher than the national average. Moreover, despite the fact that the unemployment rate fell sharply in 2013, there were still 71,000 fewer payroll positions in North Carolina in January 2014 than in December 2007—in a state growing rapidly in population.³⁸ In fact, the structural factors just discussed, combined with the problems in Charlotte’s financial sector (with Wachovia/Wells Fargo and Bank of America), the state’s heavy concentration on manufacturing, the collapse of the construction industry, and continuing robust in-migration, mean that the state’s labor market has been really stressed, especially since it never really recovered from the recession of 2000–2001. In net terms, North Carolina in 2011 had only 0.3 percent more jobs than it had in 2000—despite the fact that the population of the state grew by 18.5 percent between 2000 and 2010.³⁹ Very distressing data indeed.

Income data tell much the same tale. Median household income in the state from 2008 through 2012 was \$46,450—about 87.6 percent of the national average. A just-released study has found that the gap between median household income in the state and the national average in 2013 was the greatest it has been since 1984 and that, in real terms, median household in-

(*opposite*) FIGURE 14.1. This map charts a sudden wave of manufacturing-plant closings in North Carolina during 2003 and 2004, undermining the state’s long-standing appeal as an industrial haven with a lower-wage workforce. There were 185 manufacturing plant closings involving 26,609 employees. Data from Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.

come in North Carolina had not grown since 1984. Figures for per capita income are similar: in 2012 the figure for North Carolina (\$37,910) was about 87 percent of that of the United States as a whole, placing the state thirty-ninth in the nation. The cost-of-living index for North Carolina is about 96 percent of the national average, so the income figures can't be explained away, as they sometimes are, by claiming that low income is more than made up for by low living costs.⁴⁰

And what about poverty levels in the state? One result of North Carolina's protracted economic difficulties, not surprisingly, has been a significant rise in poverty and near poverty in the state during the last decade: the poverty rate in the state in 2012 was about 18 percent, well above the rate (16 percent) in the United States as a whole.⁴¹ As many economists and business analysts have recently pointed out, we have slowly come out of the recession—North Carolina tends to lag national recoveries—but what are we coming out to?⁴²

Unemployment and poverty will likely go down as the economy gathers momentum, but the state's stock of human capital is still relatively low, and the current administration isn't likely to improve it much. And even if it does improve, what are the prospects for much of the North Carolina's labor force—indeed, much of the U.S. labor force—to get good jobs in the years ahead? Seven of the ten occupations predicted to grow fastest in North Carolina by 2018 demand less than a high-school diploma: home health aides, food preparation and serving workers, retail salespersons, cashiers, waiters and waitresses, personal and home care aides, and landscaping and grounds-keeping workers.⁴³ Only one—accountants and auditors—demands a bachelor's degree. Moreover, if scholars such as Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee are correct, that's not the half of it. In two well-regarded books, *Race against the Machine* (2011) and *The Second Machine Age* (2014), the authors argue that, whereas until now technological change has always added jobs in a net sense, this may no longer be the case.⁴⁴ The fact that Foxconn—the biggest assembler of electronics, including the iPhone, in China, where it employs over one million workers—is increasingly replacing its workers with what it calls its “robot army” is enough to give one pause. That the company hopes to be employing only technicians and engineers in China a few years from now should be enough to stop us in our tracks. If Foxconn succeeds in so doing, it will provide evidence in support of Brynjolfsson and McAfee's provocative point that “offshoring is often only a way station on the road to automation.”⁴⁵

But back to the South, where a huge number of jobs have already been offshored. Although overstated, Michael Lind's controversial 2013 piece in

Salon, titled “Southern Poverty Pimps: The ‘Original Sin’ of the Southern Political Class Is Cheap, Powerless Labor,” contains more than an element of truth.⁴⁶ The fact that in 2013 North Carolina still had the lowest rate of unionization of any state—3.0 percent—is only the beginning.⁴⁷ Many of the poorest parts of the South today—the most plantation-intensive areas—were once the richest. In North Carolina, for example, forlorn Halifax County—home of the late lamented Randy Parton Dinner Theater and not much else—is one of the poorest counties. It once was among the wealthiest. A few years ago, a team of economic development specialists at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill was engaged to create a growth plan for the town of Enfield in that county. After a lot of work, the authors produced a lengthy study, the principal conclusion of which was that the future of the town, which had once flourished, was extremely precarious, maybe even hopeless. Some recommendations were made at the margin, but little of substance could be done.⁴⁸ Why? To invoke the memorable title of Linda Flowers’s well-known book, another place in eastern North Carolina had been “thrown away” by history.⁴⁹ And there are plenty of Enfields all over the state.

North Carolina, going in and coming out of the Great Recession, is essentially two states—one with some future possibilities, one burdened unduly by developmental strategies of the past. To be sure, economic development can be viewed as being about places or about people, and this distinction matters. Fifty years ago Beaufort County, South Carolina, was desperately poor; now it is the richest county in South Carolina, ranking first in personal per capita income. Was it because the people living in Beaufort in 1960 and their descendants somehow acquired vast new stocks of human capital and saw their fortunes change dramatically as a result? Hardly. It was because the development of Hilton Head and other rich beachfront resort communities drove out the old, largely African American population and imported affluent outsiders from other parts of South Carolina, the South, and the United States to take their place.⁵⁰

Clearly, some people and some places in North Carolina are well positioned to benefit from technological change and globalization. Others are not. Cary and Morrisville, *sí*, Lumberton, Roanoke Rapids, and Forest City, *no*.⁵¹ And I’ve written an entire article on the problems splayed before us up and down Highway 52.⁵² It is up to us to try to come up with sufficiently creative public-sector and private-sector initiatives to bring greater equity and justice to these vast forces, or the economic future of North Carolina, playing off of Faulkner, is both gone and past.

The developmental successes we have achieved over time in North Caro-

lina have been real but built on too narrow a base, with the state's middle class, however much expanded, still far too narrow to transform the state. The North Carolina development strategy historically has been ameliorist at best, with elites never willing *really* to share control. Too often they have acted as an old boy (and, more recently, old boy and girl) network, opting for rather conservative, begrudging approaches to development, akin in spirit and effect to that implied in the young Sicilian aristocrat Tancredi's famous quote in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's great novel *The Leopard*: "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change."⁵³ And this is the kind of conservative approach to development—one minimizing structural change—that North Carolina has generally done well. Plutocratic progressivism, business progressivism, call it what you will. Unfortunately, whatever it is called, it will no longer do in the increasingly borderless, ruthlessly competitive global world in which we live today. Going forward we'll need higher aspirations and broader empathies than those evident in our historic developmental strategies to date if we are to break the yoke of history, the prison of path dependency, and move ahead. If not, the economic outlook for much of the population of North Carolina is bleak, and for most of the rest, uncertain.

NOTES

1. In 1962 an article on North Carolina appeared in *National Geographic* titled "North Carolina: Dixie Dynamo." The piece garnered a lot of attention and was adopted by many politicians, economic development apparatchiks, and members of the business community as the unofficial nickname of the state. Some people still recognize the nickname even today. See Malcolm Ross, "North Carolina: Dixie Dynamo," *National Geographic* 121 (February 1962): 141–83. This chapter grew out of a paper prepared for a conference in Greensboro in March 2013. The paper was part of a session titled "Dixie Dynamo," hence its title.

2. The literature on globalization is vast, and definitions of the concept and globalization periodization schemes many. For a narrower economic view, focusing on the relative increase of transnational economic flows, see, e.g., Paul Krugman, *The Accidental Theorist and Other Dispatches from the Dismal Science* (New York: Norton, 1998), 73. Note, though, that other economists privilege different measurable phenomena to gauge globalization—price convergence, for example. See Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "When Did Globalisation Begin?," *European Review of Economic History* 6 (April 2002): 23–50; and O'Rourke and Williamson, "Once More: When Did Globalisation Begin?," *European Review of Economic History* 8 (April 2004): 109–17. By focusing narrowly on measurable, quantitative variables, most economists tend to see globalization as a relatively recent historical process, commencing in the nineteenth century. For broader socioeconomic approaches emphasizing qualitative changes, see Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), esp. 59; David Harvey,

The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 173–88; Manuel Castells, “European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy,” *New Left Review* 204 (March/April 1994): 18–32, esp. 21; and David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 59. For a good, succinct history of globalization, see Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Peterssen, *Globalization: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). On the welter of periodization schemes, see, e.g., Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Periodizing Globalization: Histories of Globalization,” *New Global Studies* 6 (July 2012): 1–24.

3. More formally, “path dependence” can be defined as a causal sequence in which the eventual outcome is virtually predetermined by antecedent factors or events. These factors or events may be proximate or remote in temporal terms and either circumstantial or structural in nature. “Path influence” relaxes the determinism somewhat while retaining the implication that numerous outcomes are excluded because of antecedent factors or events. For an excellent introduction to the concept, see Douglas Puffert, “Path Dependence,” *EH.Net Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/path-dependence/>.

4. On the many scholars employing such periodization schemes, see, e.g., Pieterse, “Periodizing Globalization.”

5. “Ghost acres” is a term coined in the 1960s denoting external, often underpopulated lands that can be utilized by a given area or country for additional “carrying capacity,” thereby easing “land” (natural-resource) constraints and allowing for additional economic production, surplus extraction, etc. Some scholars in recent years have argued that the Americas after 1492 served such a function for Europe. For one inspired attempt to employ the concept in such a way, see Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 264–97.

6. Karl Marx, *Capital*, ed. Frederick Engels, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, 3 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1967; originally published in German, 1867–1894), 1: 713–74; Bernard Bailyn, *The Barbarous Years: The Peopling of British North America: The Conflict of Civilizations, 1600–1675* (New York: Knopf, 2012).

7. For estimates of the enslaved population of North Carolina c. 1750–1770, see A. Roger Ekirch, “Poor Carolina”: *Politics and Society in Colonial North Carolina, 1729–1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 11; and Marvin L. Michael Kay and Lorin Lee Cary, *Slavery in North Carolina, 1748–1775* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 226–27, table 1.2.

8. See Eric J. Hobsbawm’s trilogy on the “long nineteenth century”: *The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848* (New York: New American Library, 1962), *The Age of Capital: 1848–1875* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), and *The Age of Empire: 1875–1914* (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 4 vols. (New York: Academic Press, 1974–89; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

9. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital: 1848–1875*, 82. On the role of U.S. cotton in the world economy in the nineteenth century, see especially Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Knopf, 2014).

10. Rankings drawn from U.S. census data brought together in Donald B. Dodd and Wynelle S. Dodd, comps., *Historical Statistics of the South 1970-1970* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1973).

11. Rankings drawn from U.S. census data brought together in *ibid.*

12. Rankings and figures for tobacco production are based on U.S. census data brought together in *ibid.* Note, however, that bright tobacco, which predominated in North Carolina, generally sold at much higher prices than did burley tobacco, which dominated in Kentucky.

13. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Eighth Census of the United States, 1860: Population* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), 348-57. North Carolina's total population in 1860 was 992,622, broken down in the following way: whites, 629,942; free colored, 30,463; slaves, 331,059; Indians, 1,158. The percentage enslaved was 33.4 percent.

14. On the tight, coercive labor regimen in North Carolina, see, e.g., Philip J. Wood, *Southern Capitalism: The Political Economy of North Carolina 1880-1980* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986). On the tight labor controls in the North Carolina lumber industry and labor's efforts to loosen them, see William P. Jones, *The Tribe of Black Ulysses: African American Lumber Workers in the Jim Crow South* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005). Note that one of Jones's cases centers on Elizabethtown, N.C.

15. See, e.g., Wood, *Southern Capitalism*; Dwight B. Billings Jr., *Planters and the Making of a "New South": Class, Politics, and Development in North Carolina, 1865-1900* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). Note that both Wood and Billings tend to downplay some of the real changes that were in fact beginning to occur in parts of North Carolina (particularly in the Piedmont) in the late nineteenth century. On these changes, see David L. Carlton, "The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the Beginnings of Industrialization in North Carolina," *Journal of American History* 77 (September 1990): 445-75; and David L. Carlton and Peter A. Coclanis, "Capital Mobilization and Southern Industry, 1880-1905: The Case of the Carolina Piedmont," *Journal of Economic History* 49 (March 1989): 73-94. For an extreme example of the economic structure to which most plantation areas of the South tended, see Peter A. Coclanis, *The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina Low Country, 1670-1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

16. There are few modern general studies of slavery or even of agriculture in nineteenth-century North Carolina, though there are some excellent local and regional studies. See, e.g., Edward W. Phifer, "Slavery in Microcosm: Burke County, North Carolina," *Journal of Southern History* 28 (May 1962): 137-65; and John C. Inscoe, *Mountain Masters, Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis in Western North Carolina* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989). On agriculture in antebellum North Carolina, see two studies by Cornelius O. Cathey: *Agricultural Developments in North Carolina, 1783-1860*, James Sprunt Series in History and Political Science, vol. 38 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956); and *Agriculture in North Carolina before the Civil War* (Raleigh, N.C.: Division of Archives and History, 1966).

17. William A. Link, *North Carolina: Change and Tradition in a Southern State* (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 2009), 289.

18. *Ibid.*, 376.

19. On southern progressivism, see, e.g., C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South*,

1877–1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 369–95; George B. Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South, 1913–1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 219–53; Dewey W. Grantham, *Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983); and William A. Link, *The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, 1880–1930* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). On some of the effects of progressive reform on education in North Carolina specifically, see J. Morgan Kousser, “Progressivism—for Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina, 1880–1910,” *Journal of Southern History* 46 (May 1980): 169–94; James L. Leloudis, *Schooling the New South: Pedagogy, Self, and Society in North Carolina, 1880–1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 143–228; and Rob Christensen, *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics: The Personalities, Elections, and Events That Shaped Modern North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 39–45. On the rise to prominence in the 1920s and 1930s of the University of North Carolina, see Michael O’Brien, *The Idea of the American South, 1920–1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 3–27, 213–27; and Daniel Joseph Singal, *The War Within: From Victorian to Modernist Thought in the South, 1919–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 115–52, 265–338.

20. On the varying ways in which the label is employed in general histories of North Carolina, see, e.g., William S. Powell, *North Carolina through Four Centuries* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 245; Link, *North Carolina*, 151–52; and Milton Ready, *The Tar Heel State: A History of North Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 13, 360–61.

21. See Omar Ibn Said, *A Muslim American Slave: The Life of Omar Ibn Said*, trans. and ed. Ala Alryyes (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011); and J. C. Turk, “Building an American Bridge in Burma,” *World’s Work* 2 (September 1901): 1148–67, esp. 1166.

22. See Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

23. See, e.g., Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Jari Eloranta and Mark Harrison, “War and Disintegration, 1914–1945,” in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2:133–55.

24. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: The National Data Book* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004), 66–67, <https://www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-35.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2014). The data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business* (May 2002), and from the bureau’s unpublished data. On the Consumer Price Index in North Carolina in 1929, see Abner Hurwitz and Carlyle P. Stallings, “Interregional Differentials in Per Capita Real Income Change,” in *Regional Income*, Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 21, National Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), 195–270, esp. 226, table A-2. Note that Hurwitz and Stallings actually put per capita income in North Carolina as a percentage of the U.S. average at 46.6 percent, a bit lower than the figure used in the text. See *ibid.*, 252, table A-7.

25. Woodward, *Origins of the New South*, 369–95; Tindall, *Emergence of the New South*, 219–84; V. O. Key Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, with Alexander Heard (New

York: Knopf, 1949), 205–28; Christensen, *Paradox of Tar Heel Politics*, 35–108; David L. Carlton and Peter A. Coclanis, “Another ‘Great Migration’: From Region to Race in Southern Liberalism, 1938–1945,” *Southern Cultures* 4 (Winter 1997): 437–62; Bart Dredge, “Defending White Supremacy: David Clark and the *Southern Textile Bulletin*, 1911–1955,” *North Carolina Historical Review* 89 (January 2012): 59–91. On road building and highway infrastructure, which were high developmental priorities in North Carolina during this period, see Tammy Ingram, *Dixie Highway: Road Building and the Making of the Modern South, 1900–1930* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

26. On the basic periodization, see, e.g., Osterhammel and Peterssen, *Globalization: A Short History*, 113–52; Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, “Commodity Market Integration, 1500–2000,” in *Globalization in Historical Perspective*, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 13–62; and Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Norton, 2006), 253–476. On the South's place in this scheme, Alfred E. Eckes Jr., “The South and Economic Globalization, 1950 to the Future,” in *Globalization and the American South*, ed. James C. Cobb and William Stueck (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005), 36–65.

27. See, e.g., George B. Tindall, “Business Progressivism: Southern Politics in the 1920s,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 62 (Winter 1963): 92–106; Tindall, *Emergence of the New South, 1913–1945*, 219–84; and James C. Cobb, *Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877–1984* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 27–50. Note that Tindall argues that the “business progressive” approach established in the 1920s continued strong in southern politics in subsequent decades. Most analysts of politics in twentieth-century North Carolina have accepted Tindall's point, although they have not always used the same terminology. Paul Luebke, for example, prefers the term “modernizers.” Writers including V. O. Key Jr., Rob Christensen, and Tom Eamon, however, have all identified and written about a tradition similar to the one Tindall referred to as “business progressive.” See Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, 205–28; Paul Luebke, *Tar Heel Politics: Myths and Realities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Christensen, *Paradox of Tar Heel Politics*; Rob Christensen, “Which Wing Will Prevail?,” *News and Observer* (Raleigh, N.C.), January 30, 2011; and Tom Eamon, *The Making of a Southern Democracy: North Carolina Politics from Kerr Scott to Pat McCrory* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 369n32 and passim. Note, too, that Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, writing in the mid-1970s, accept the nomenclature but view North Carolina as anything but “progressive” politically at the time. See Bass and De Vries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence since 1945* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 218–47.

28. See Cobb, *Industrialization and Southern Society*, 51–120; Gavin Wright, *Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 239–74; Bruce J. Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938–1980* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 63–173; and David L. Carlton, “Smokestack-Chasing and Its Discontents: Southern Development Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” in *The American South in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Craig S. Pascoe, Karen Trahan Leathem, and Andy Ambrose (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005), 106–26.

29. Peter A. Coclanis and Louis M. Kyriakouides, “Selling Which South? Economic

Change in Rural and Small-Town North Carolina in an Era of Globalization, 1940–2007,” *Southern Cultures* 13 (Winter 2007): 86–102; Robert Lewis, “World War II Manufacturing and the Postwar Southern Economy,” *Journal of Southern History* 73 (November 2007): 837–66; Peter A. Coclanis and David L. Carlton, “Southern Economic Commentary in Historical Perspective,” in *A Way Forward: Building a Globally Competitive South*, ed. Daniel P. Gitterman and Peter A. Coclanis (Chapel Hill: Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in association with the University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 12–16; Peter A. Coclanis and Louis M. Kyriakouides, “The Rural South and the Burden of the Past,” in Gitterman and Coclanis, *A Way Forward*, 17–25; Mac McCorkle, “History and the ‘New Economy’ Narrative: The Case of Research Triangle Park and North Carolina’s Economic Development,” *Journal of the Historical Society* 12 (December 2012): 479–525.

30. See Coclanis and Carlton, “Southern Economic Commentary,” 14; David L. Carlton, unpublished database, Southern PCI, 1929–2012. This database tracks per capita income in the South against per capita income in the United States as a whole. Carlton generously made this database available to the author.

31. See MDC, Inc., *Shadows in the Sunbelt: Developing the Rural South in an Era of Economic Change* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: MDC, Inc., 1986). Another very important report, expressing many similar themes, was published in the same year by the Southern Growth Policies Board: *Halfway Home and a Long Way to Go: The Report of the 1986 Commission on the Future of the South* (Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Southern Growth Policies Board, 1986). Also see Schulman, *From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt*, 178–205; and Coclanis and Kyriakouides, “Selling Which South?”

32. See Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); and Florida, *The Flight of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition for Talent* (New York: HarperBusiness, 2005). On the way in which these factors played out in North Carolina, see Michael L. Walden, *North Carolina in the Connected Age: Challenges and Opportunities in a Globalizing Economy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); and Coclanis and Kyriakouides, “Rural South and the Burden of the Past.” On high poverty rates within thriving metropolitan areas of North Carolina, see Allen Serkin and Stephen Whitlow, *The State of North Carolina Urban Distressed Communities* (Chapel Hill: Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, February 2005); Gene Nichol, “In Urban North Carolina, Deep Pockets of Misery Are Masked,” *News and Observer* (Raleigh, N.C.), September 29, 2013, <http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/09/29/3239177/in-urban-north-carolina-deep-pockets.html>; Jim Wise, “Poverty Persists While Durham Prospers,” *Durham News*, December 31, 2013; and William High and Todd Owen, *North Carolina’s Distressed Urban Tracts: A View of the State’s Economically Disadvantaged Communities*, CURS Report no. 2014-01 (Chapel Hill: Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, February 2014), <https://curs.unc.edu/files/2014/02/NC-Distress-Update-final.pdf>.

33. On the middle-income trap, see, e.g., Homi Kharas and Harinder Kohli, “What Is the Middle Income Trap, Why Do Countries Fall into It, and How Can It Be Avoided?,” *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies* 3 (September 2011): 281–89, <http://eme.sagepub.com/content/3/3/281.full.pdf+html>. For some important new empirical work on the same, see Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin, “Growth Slowdowns Redux: New Evidence on the Middle-Income Trap,” NBER working paper 18673, National Bureau of

Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., January 2013, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18673>. On the possibility of such a trap in the South, see Peter A. Coclanis, "Chasing the Shadows from Today's Sunbelt," *Wall Street Journal*, September 14, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444709004577649552864075244>.

34. Quoted in Bass and De Vries, *Transformation of Southern Politics*, 218–19.

35. See, e.g., Jim Yardley, "Bangladesh Takes Steps to Raise \$38 a Month Minimum Wage," *New York Times*, November 5, 2013; and Jason Burke, "Bangladesh Garment Workers Set for 77% Pay Increase," *Guardian*, November 14, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/bangladesh-garment-workers-pay-rise>.

36. David L. Carlton and Peter A. Coclanis, "Southern Textiles in Global Context," in *Global Perspectives on Industrial Transformation in the American South*, ed. Susanna Delfino and Michele Gillespie (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005), 151–74.

37. See "Pillowtex Closing 16 Plants, Laying Off 6,450," *USA Today*, July 30, 2003, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/manufacturing/2003-07-30-pillowtex_x.htm; and Tim Reaves, "10 Years after the Fall, Dream Endures for 'New Kannapolis,'" *Hickory (N.C.) Daily Record*, July 29, 2013. For a scholarly case study of the closing, see Timothy J. Minchin, "It Knocked This City to Its Knees': The Closure of Pillowtex Mills in Kannapolis, North Carolina and the Decline of the US Textile Industry," *Labor History* 50 (August 2009): 287–311.

38. Daniel P. Gitterman, Peter A. Coclanis, and John Quintero, "Recession and Recovery in North Carolina: A Data Snapshot, 2007–12," Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina, August 2012, <http://gri.unc.edu/files/2012/08/GRI-Data-Snapshot-August-2012.pdf>; David Bracken, "NC Jobless Rate Dips to 6.7% in January," *News and Observer* (Raleigh, N.C.), March 17, 2014.

39. Gitterman et al., *Recession and Recovery in North Carolina*, 5.

40. The figures on median household income and per capita income in North Carolina in 2012 are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "QuickFacts, North Carolina, Median Household Income, 2008–12," <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html> (accessed March 3, 2014); U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, "BEARFACTS, North Carolina, Per Capita Personal Income, 2012," <http://www.bea.gov/regional/bearfacts/action.cfm> (accessed March 3, 2014). The comparative data on median household income in 1984 and 2013 are from South by North Strategies, Ltd., "A Comeback Short of the Mark: Income Trends in North Carolina in the Wake of the Great Recession," prepared for Think NC First, April 2015, http://files.www.thinkncfirst.org/news/new-report-finds-nc-household-income-missing-from-a-carolina-comeback/Trends_Report.pdf. The cost-of-living index for North Carolina is from Missouri Department of Economic Development, Missouri Economic Research and Information Center, "Cost of Living Data Series: Third Quarter 2016," http://www.missourieconomy.org/indicators/cost_of_living/index.stm (accessed March 3, 2014).

41. Alemayehu Bishaw, "Poverty: 2000 to 2012, American Community Survey Briefs," doc. ACSBR/12-1, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau, September 2013, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr12-01.pdf>, p. 5, table 2.

42. Michael L. Walden, "Has North Carolina Lost Its Mojo?," *News and Observer* (Raleigh, N.C.), September 21, 2012.

43. Daniel P. Gitterman and Peter A. Coclanis, "Moving beyond Plato versus Plumbing: Individualized Education and Career Passways for All North Carolinians," Global Research Institute, University of North Carolina, September 2012, 10–12, http://www.sbnstrategies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/GRI-Plato_vs_Plumbing-Sept-2012.pdf.
44. Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, *Race against the Machine* (Lexington, Mass.: Digital Frontier Press, 2011), esp. 28–52; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, *The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technology* (New York: Norton, 2014), esp. 163–85.
45. Michael Kan, "Foxconn to Speed Up 'Robot Army' Deployment," *PCWorld*, June 26, 2013, <http://www.pcworld.com/article/2043026/foxconn-to-speed-up-robot-army-deployment-20000-robots-already-in-its-factories.html>; Jason Dorrier, "Foxconn's Pivot to America: Reverse Outsourcing with Robots," SingularityHUB, February 23, 2014, <http://singularityhub.com/2014/02/23/foxconns-pivot-to-america-reverse-outsourcing-with-robots/>; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, *Second Machine Age*, 142, 184–85.
46. Michael Lind, "Southern Poverty Pimps: The 'Original Sin' of the Southern Political Class Is Cheap, Powerless Labor," *Salon*, February 19, 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/02/19/southern_poverty_pimps/.
47. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Union Members Summary," January 24, 2014, <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nro.htm>.
48. G. Jason Jolley, E. Brent Lane, and Aaron Nousaine, "Enfield Economic Development Master Plan," prepared for Enfield Partnership for Tomorrow, UNC Center for Competitive Economies, August 2011, http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/~media/Files/kenaninstitute/C3E/Enfield_EconomicDevelopment_Plan.pdf.
49. Linda Flowers, *Thrown Away: Failures of Progress in Eastern North Carolina* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990).
50. On Beaufort County's economic position in South Carolina over the centuries up until the 1980s, see Coclanis, *Shadow of a Dream*, 299–300 and *passim*. On personal per capita income in Beaufort County today, see South Carolina Association of Counties, *County Profiles* (Columbia: South Carolina Association of Counties, June 2012), 7.
51. Three "areas" in North Carolina—Forest City (no. 9), Roanoke Rapids (no. 3), and Lumberton (no. 1)—were recently ranked by credit.com as being among the ten poorest in the United States in terms of median household income. The ranking scheme was based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2012 American Community Survey. Note that the units were not the cities themselves but the micropolitan and metropolitan statistical areas of which the cities were part. See Christine DiGangi, "The Poorest Areas in America," credit.com, September 24, 2013, <http://blog.credit.com/2013/09/poorest-cities-in-america/>.
52. Peter A. Coclanis, "Down Highway 52: Globalization, Higher Education, and the Economic Future of the American South," *Journal of the Historical Society* 5 (Fall 2005): 331–45.
53. Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, *The Leopard*, trans. Archibald Colquhoun (New York: Pantheon, 1960; originally published in Italian in 1958), 40.